My own hunch is that, on balance, the additional monetary policy inertia imparted by group decisionmaking provides a net benefit to society… But my main point is simpler: My experience as a member of the FOMC left me with a strong feeling that the theoretical fiction that monetary policy is made by a single individual maximizing a well-defined preference function misses something important. In my view, monetary theorists should start paying some attention to the nature of decisionmaking by committee, which is rarely mentioned in the academic literature. (Blinder (1998), p. 22) I made reference in that lecture to only one paper on the subject, Faust's (1996) clever model of the seemingly-odd construction of the FOMC, though I should have cited Waller's (1992) earlier work as well. (Mea culpa.) My point is that, up to then, there had been hardly any research on committee decisionmaking.
Fortunately, that is no longer the case. By the time of my three Okun lectures at Yale in 2002 (Blinder (2004) ), the subject merited a whole lecture, including references to about ten papers on the subject-and I missed some. (Mea culpa again.) The literature has continued to grow since then, including seven papers at a Netherlands Central Bank conference in 2005 and eleven papers at a Bank of Norway conference last year. The study of central banking by committee thus appears to be a growth industry, albeit a small one.
In this paper, I try to take stock of what we think we know-and what we do not know-about several questions that have been asked in this still-very-young literature. I also pose a few new questions. My jumping off point is two facts.
1. The data show an unmistakable trend toward more and more central banks making monetary policy decisions by committees rather than by single individuals (Blinder (2004) , Chapter 2), which suggests that committee decisions are, for some reason(s), perceived to be superior.
Monetary policy committees (MPCs) come in a wide variety of shapes and
sizes, suggesting either that the principal determinants of optimal committee
design have yet to be pinned down, or that some of these determinants vary across nations--probably both.
Regarding Fact 1, the choices made by a number of countries in the last 15 years or so indicate an evolving consensus that (a) the committee-versus-individual choice matters for monetary policy and (b) committees make superior decisions, on average. But Fact 2 reveals that there is as yet no consensus on a host of important design issues. So I begin with Fact 1 but concentrate on Fact 2.
Are committee decisions different? Better?
Do the decisions of monetary policy committees differ systematically from those of individual central bankers? Notice that my opening quotation strongly suggested that they do and that, in particular, committee-based decisions are more consensual and more inertial and, for those reasons, possibly better. But is it true?
Subsequent experimental research by John Morgan and me Morgan, 2005, 2007) has been kinder to the last part of this presumption than to the first. In two different experiments, one with 100 Princeton University students and the other with 252
University of California, Berkeley students, we found clear evidence that committees (which were of sizes 4, 5, and 8 in the experiments) outperform individual decisionmakers in making simulated monetary policy. Lombardelli et al. (2005) found the same in a near-replication of our work using students at the London School of Economics.
However, contrary to my 1996 suggestion, committees do not appear to acquire their edge by being more inertial. In fact, the most stunning finding of Blinder and Morgan (2005) , which was subsequently replicated in Blinder and Morgan (2007) , is that committees do not react more slowly (nor more quickly) to demand shocks than individuals do. Instead, they perform better because they make fewer mistakes-without taking longer to reach decisions. 2 One strong suggestion emerging from the experimental results is that there are genuine gains from group interactions. Committees do not just reflect the average opinions of their member. They do not simply follow the median voter rule. And they are not dominated by their most skilled members. 3 Instead, the group seems to generate some sort of collective wisdom that makes the whole somewhat greater than the sum of its parts.
Anne Sibert (2006) 
Types of monetary policy committees
Committees differ along a number of dimensions. In this section, I deal briefly with six: the degree of consensus achieved (or enforced), the strength of the committee's leader, voting procedures (or the absence thereof), the committee's size, its composition between "insiders" (that is, full-time employees of the bank) and "outsiders," and how committee members are selected.
Degree of consensus
In a series of papers beginning with Blinder et al. (2001) Bank of Norway may be another. (In deference to our hosts, I will let the Bank of Canada classify itself.) On a genuinely-collegial committee, the chairman is less dominant.
Members basically agree in advance to reach a group decision, and then they accept the result even if they are not entirely happy with it. The ECB Governing Council is the most prominent contemporary example of this type.
Which system works best? There is probably no single answer that works for all times and places. But I argued in Blinder (2004) that an individualistic committee is probably best suited to exploiting the advantages of committees over individuals-if it can solve the "cacophony problem" of speaking with too many (possibly conflicting)
voices. Toward that end, it may be wise to throw a dash of collegiality into the mix.
Does strong leadership improve decisionmaking?
In choosing among individualistic, genuinely-collegial, and autocratically-collegial committee structures, one important consideration is how important it is to have a strong leader. 7 Almost by definition, the committee's chair has the most power in an autocratically-collegial committee and the least in an individualistic committee, with genuinely-collegial committees ranging in between. But which arrangement leads to the best performance?
There is no simple answer to this question. I have just suggested, on conceptual grounds, that something between an individualistic and a genuinely-collegial committee structure might be optimal. That blend seems to imply that the chairman does not dominate the proceedings. But even that tentative conclusion could easily be overturned by evidence that an MPC needs strong leadership to function well. Is there such evidence?
It is possible to read the good track records of the Fed under, e.g., Volcker and Greenspan, and of the Bundesbank under, e.g., Poehl and Tietmeyer, as evidence in favor of this proposition. Indeed, the Fed has a longstanding tradition of dominance by its chairman (c.f. Blinder (1998) and Meyer (2004) ). A number of empirical papers have studied the role of the FOMC chairman. We know that Alan Greenspan tended to speak longer in FOMC meetings than the other members (Chappell et al., (2005) ), and his domination of the committee was legendary. According to Chappell et al. (2004) , the impact of Chairman Arthur Burns on policy decisions corresponded to a voting weight of 40-50% of the whole committee. Romer and Romer (2004) argue that even chairmen who were not perceived as particularly able policymakers were influential.
There is much less scholarly research on the role of the chairman in other countries.
But it appears that the ECB, during its short history to date, has not been nearly as concludes that the chairman does not have much impact on the path of the policy rate.
Instead, he reduces the disagreement among committee members.
One way in which the committee chair might try to dominate the decisionmaking process is to offer his opinions first (or even to inform other members of his views prior to the formal meeting), thus leaving other committee members the stark choice between going along and dissenting. One major concern related to group-think is avoiding what are called "information cascades." The term refers to the increasing reluctance to dissent, and the mounting incentives to hide one's private information, as more and more speakers express identical opinions (e.g., agree with the chairman)-which, if it happens, can extinguish information and stifle debate. Committee members want to appear well-informed, and they care about their reputations and careers. Being "wrong" damages both and, in an uncertain world, nobody knows what is really "right." So there is a natural tendency (and an incentive) to "go along to get along." As the cliché says, there's safety in numbers.
To overcome the tendency toward information cascades, some hierarchies and judicial systems operate with explicit anti-seniority rules. The idea is that, if more senior members speak later, more information will be extracted from the junior members, who can express their opinions freely without the disapprobation of more senior experts. But the anti-seniority rule is not always optimal. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) prove that there is no optimal speaking order when committee members have similar levels of expertise. They also show that, if there is a large variance in expertise across the committee, speaking in anti-seniority order may actually lead the committee to an inferior decision by incentivizing the most capable member to conceal his own private information.
John Morgan and I (Blinder and Morgan, 2007) But resolving it econometrically seems a daunting (possibly impossible) task.
Voting procedures
Should (and do) MPCs make decisions by holding a formal vote? Making decisions by the unanimity principle versus by majority vote is a hardy perennial topic in the academic literature on group decisionmaking, much of which pertains to either elections or juries. The notion that majority voting is an efficient method way to aggregate information can be traced back all the way to Condorcet (1785). Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) confirm the idea by showing that majority voting can achieve full information equivalence in large elections. In a subsequent paper on voting rules in a jury setting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show that a unanimity rule leads to a higher probability of acquitting the guilty and convicting the innocent. Both results point toward majority voting. But Coughlan (2000) demonstrates that a unanimity rule can perform as well as any alternative rule in minimizing the probability of error in an environment in which jurors have similar preferences and can communicate effectively with each other. In other words, it is not so much the voting rule per se as the atmosphere of deliberation and the composition of the decisionmaking body.
But does one voting rule consistently outperform the other in terms of aggregating information in the specific context of monetary policy? In Blinder and Morgan's (2005) experiment, the results of the two voting rules were basically indistinguishable from one another. But they worried that this finding might be a consequence of the low stakes in the experiment. 9 A theoretical paper by Gerlach-Kristen (2006) argues that voting outperforms averaging if there is uncertainty about the state of the economy-which, of course, there always is.
Yet formal voting on MPCs is less common than might be imagined. In their wellknown survey of 94 central banks, Fry et al. (2000) found that, of the 79 that make decisions by committee, only 36 do so through formal voting. The other 43 reach decisions by consensus.
If formal votes are held, should the results be disclosed to the public? It may seem that the answer is obviously "yes," but disclosing individual votes might subject MPC members to political pressures, as Gersbach and Hahn (2005) show in a game-theoretic model of the ECB. However, Buiter (1999) argues that non-transparent voting reduces accountability and provides scope for undue influence, and Sibert (2003) finds that delaying the release of votes reduces welfare because it leads to less reputation building. So the theoretical issue seems open, though the burden of proof should rest on those who argue for secrecy.
Committee size
Real world MPCs vary greatly in size, ranging from a low of three members (at the Swiss National Bank) to a high of 21 (the ECB, so far). Table 1 shows the size distribution of monetary policy committees specified by law across a wide range of central banks in several recent years. While the distribution is quite spread out, there appears to be a pretty strong mode in the 7-to-9 member range.
9 Minority members did not want to hold the group up when unanimity was required. (1) and (3) • the committee's composition. If you want different types of people (e.g., economists, bankers, businesspeople, etc.) on the committee, you will need a larger committee.
• the committee's scope. Committees responsible for multiple functions (e.g., bank supervision and regulation, payments systems, etc.) probably need to be larger than committees that only do monetary policy. (More on these two points below.)
• the desired degree of consensus. It is probably easier to achieve consensus on a smaller committee.
• the size of the country. Especially if there is rapid turnover among board members, small countries with large committees may find themselves exhausting the available talent pool.
• the nature of the government that appoints it. For example, the multi-national character of the ECB probably dictates a large committee, as did the dispersed federal structure of the United States in 1913.
A cross-sectional empirical study of actual (not necessarily optimal) committee size by Berger et al. (2006) found that MPCs tend to have more members in larger and more heterogeneous countries, those with democratic institutions, and those with flexible exchange rates. All this makes sense. Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007) The recent brouhaha over the appointment of a new governor of the Bank of Japan was a stunning case in point. So I think it is safe to declare the exclusion of finance or treasury representatives from the MPC as part of "best practice"-even though it is not always followed. 
Appointment procedures
Appointment and removal procedures are relevant to the considerations just discussed (what sorts of people should be on MPCs?), and also to the delicate balance between ensuring central bank independence, on the one hand, and enhancing democratic accountability and legitimacy, on the other. The former suggests that appointments to monetary policy committees should be made by the politically-responsible authorities, which could mean either the president or prime minister (or, as in the British case, his agent) or the legislature or parliament, depending on how a country is governed. But it does rule out self-perpetuating oligarchies.
Central bank independence also points to long terms of office as one way to shield monetary policy from political pressures. In their survey of 101 central banks, Lybek and Morris (2004) found that 66% have fixed terms of four years or more. In one extreme case, governors of the US Federal Reserve Board have fourteen-year terms. Almost no Fed governors, however, actually serve a full term. ECB Executive Board terms run eight years but, at least so far, most members serve their terms out.
17 Table 2 , which is based on Moutot et al. (2008) , shows an international comparison of the appointments and terms of office of MPC members at eight rich-country central banks. The long terms are evident, while renewability varies. Moutot et al (2008) As important as central bank independence is, it cannot be absolute in a democracy.
There should, for example, be some ultimate political check on the authority of the central bank-for example, by giving the elected government the ability to fire MPC members or to take back some of the central bank's power under extreme circumstances.
18 But since this "nuclear option" will rarely, if ever, be invoked, it seems wise to have some milder way to mitigate the "democracy deficit." Giving the power to appoint central bank officials to politicians who must stand for election seems a good option.
Different countries have apparently balanced these considerations in different ways.
As mentioned earlier, seven members of the FOMC are politically appointed by the Staggering of terms is sometimes adopted to ensure the institutional continuity of monetary policy making, to reduce the level of politicization, and perhaps even to reduce the tendency toward group-think by regularly introducing new members. Using a gametheoretic approach, Tabellini (1987) first showed that staggered terms can provide reputational incentives so that a finitely-lived committee with overlapping terms can operate as if there will never be a "last period." Waller (1992) later rationalized staggering as a way to reduce political swings from dovishness to hawkishness as a result of elections. Despite these arguments, and despite the prominent examples of the ECB and the Fed, staggering has not been adopted by the majority of MPCs. Among the central banks surveyed by Lybek and Morris, for example, only about 20% use de jure 18 On this, see Lohmann (1992) . In the US case, extreme circumstances are not even required. The Congress can end the Federal Reserve's independence any day it chooses. staggered terms. However, occasional vacancies and renewability of terms create some de facto staggering.
Committees and communication
In a recent paper (Blinder, 2007) substitutes. An autocratically-collegial committee should be able to deliver a detailed and coherent explanation of its action immediately. After all, the chairman almost certainly knows the outcome before the meeting starts. If the statement is sufficiently long and detailed, there is little need for detailed minutes and no rush to produce them. The minutes will not contain much market-relevant information, anyway.
But things may be quite different at the end of a meeting of a genuinely-collegial committee. First, the chairman may not know the outcome of the meeting in advance, which clearly prevents him from drafting an explanatory statement beforehand. And drafting a detailed statement by committee in real time is quite a challenge. Second, while committee members may all agree on the decision, they may disagree over the reasoning behind it. 20 If so, issuing a detailed statement right after the meeting might be quite difficult, leaving a terse statement as the only viable alternative. In such cases, the minutes assume greater importance and need to be released sooner and to be more detailed.
The immediate communication problem is even more acute for an individualistic committee, whose decisions are apt to be non-unanimous. And even if everyone votes the same way, members are likely to disagree over the rationales. In a situation like that, agreeing on an immediate explanatory statement may prove to be impossible. In the absence of such a statement, the entire burden of explanation falls on the minutes, which must therefore be quite detailed and should be released as soon as possible.
A second pertinent example is the disclosure of forward-looking information, up to The size of the committee may also affect an MPC's communication strategy. While the difficulties are often exaggerated, it is harder for a larger group to agree on wording.
Indeed, this appears to be a severe practical problem right now for the FOMC, which issues a brief statement after each meeting. Even though these statements are terse and stylized, committee members reportedly have a hard time agreeing on the wordingleading to the exchange of numerous drafts. And the words sometimes leave people puzzled anyway. It may be that issuing, say, a coherent 500-word explanatory statement is literally beyond the FOMCs current capabilities.
If this conundrum is genuine, it raises a delicate chicken-egg issue. I have emphasized that the decision on committee size may dictate some aspects of the communication policies. But if a monetary policy committee is so large that it cannot communicate clearly, effectively, and honestly, maybe it is too large.
Whose forecasts?
One are thus a curious hodge-podge which is hard to interpret-although showing the entire distribution (as the FOMC now does) helps a bit.
Could the forecast exercise be done better? I am sure the answer is yes. But the fact remains that a 19-member committee will find it hard to agree on a long list of numbers, even if most of them are Ph.D. economists, as is true on the FOMC today. If you add a bunch of people who carry dramatically different intellectual baggage into the room, agreement may become even more elusive. In such cases, the staff forecast might be a sensible focal point.
A Summing Up
It seems probable that more thinking has gone into the question of what a monetary policy committee should look like over the last decade than over the preceding century.
While we have not yet reached agreement on everything, and may never do so, one way to sum up this talk is to ask what might be considered "best practice" right now. If you were a country currently thinking about redesigning your monetary policy apparatus, what sort of monetary policy committee would you set up? Posing this question is probably also a good way to provoke my discussants into disagreements.
To begin with the most obvious point, I think you would choose to have a MPC rather than a single policymaker. The weight of both theory and evidence-plus, of course, international practice-points strongly in that direction. The optimal size for your MPC is less clear. While 7-9 members seems to be the most popular choice around the world, a small country might find it challenging to staff a committee of, say, nine, especially if turnover is rapid. 21 You also should not make the committee so large that it finds it difficult to communicate clearly and in some detail. As mentioned, your communication strategy-including the type of forecast you publish-needs to be custom-tailored to the nature and structure of your committee.
In terms of committee type, I believe you would try to strike a balance between the virtues of diversity that are the hallmark of an individualistic committee and the clarity of communication that is the virtue of a genuinely-collegial committee-that is, wind up somewhere between the Bank of England and the ECB. The virtues of diversity suggest that not all members need to be specialists in monetary economics. The virtues of collegiality, plus the research I have mentioned, suggest that it is not essential to have a dominant chairman.
All committee members should be appointed by the government, although precisely what that means must depend on the details of the country's system of governance. If the legal arrangements imply individual accountability, then voting records should be in the public domain. But if the MPC has group accountability only, then there is a case for withholding that information.
I also believe that every MPC member should be a full-time employee of the central bank-which is certainly the international norm. However, it may be best-as a safeguard against group-think-if bank careerists constitute only a minority of the committee's membership. A committee comprised of a healthy blend of monetary policy specialists (the majority) and a few others is probably advisable in most cases.
22
Many of you may now be comparing your own country's practices to this abstract standard of "best practice." In the case of the United States, the comparison looks pretty favorable to the FOMC, but with four exceptions. First, the Fed chairman may have been too dominant, and the rest of the committee too passive, historically. Interestingly, Ben
Bernanke seems to have changed that. Second, a 19-member committee is probably too large. Third, only a minority of the FOMC membership is politically appointed. And fourth, the Fed does not communicate often or clearly enough.
It need hardly be said that each of these judgments on what constitutes best practice is tentative, based partly on the research to date and partly on experience. Further research may temper or even overturn some of them. And more research is certainly needed. 22 The main exception would be if monetary policy is the committee's sole responsibility.
